

Message Text

PAGE 01 VIENNA 09593 01 OF 02 201804Z

44

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 9593

FROM US MBFR REP

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: FRG REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVES ON 16 NOVEMBER

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REPORT OF 16 NOVEMBER CONVERSATION BETWEEN
FRG REP BEHRENDS AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES KHLESTOV AND KVITSINSKY.
TEXT WAS DISTRIBUTED BY FRG DEPREP AT 19 NOV AD HOC GROUP MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT:

AT THE REQUEST OF MR. KHLESTOV, I MET HIM ON FRIDAY 16TH NOVEMBER.
MEETING LASTED 90 MINUTES. ON THE SOVIET SIDE MR. KVITSINSKY AND
ONE INTERPRETER PARTICIPATED, ON OUR SIDE MR. HOLSCHER TOOK PART
IN THE MEETING. THE DISCUSSION WAS SOMEWHAT FORMAL SINCE MR. KHLESTOV

INSISTED ON SPEAKING THROUGH THE INTERPRETER.

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 09593 01 OF 02 201804Z

BEHRENDS STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF EXCHANGING DATA. KHLESTOV SAID
THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY SINCE BOTH SIDES KNEW THE DATA. BESIDES
EACH SIDE WOULD SUSPECT THAT THE OTHER SIDE WOULD JUGGLE THE DATA,
IN ORDER TO PROVE THEIR POINTS.

BEHREND POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR A PROTOCOL LISTING THE UNITS TO BE REDUCED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS. THIS WOULD REQUIRE EXCHANGE AND AGREEMENT ON VERY DETAILED DATA. WE COULD THEREFORE NOT UNDERSTAND SOVIET RETICENCE AS TO A DISCUSSION OF DATA.

KHLESTOV SAID THAT AT A CERTAIN STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN THE PROTOCOL WAS ESTABLISHED, AN EXCHANGE OF DATA WOULD BE NECESSARY. KHLESTOV COMPLAINED THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES DID NOT COMMENT ON THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH REPRESENTED A SERIOUS PROPOSAL AND A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

BEHREND POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE TO DISCUSS THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT SINCE THE WEST COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DOCTRINE ON WHICH IT WAS BASED. IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROCEED IN A METHODIC WAY AND DISCUSS FIRST THE GENERAL APPROACH INCLUDING THE DISPARITIES. WITHOUT TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE DISPARITIES, REDUCTIONS WOULD SERIOUSLY DIMINISH OUR SECURITY. MR. STRULAK IN HIS INTERVENTION HAD MENTIONED THAT ALSO THE EAST COULD LIST DISPARITIES FAVOURING THE WEST BUT DID NOT WISH TO DO SO. IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF THE EAST WOULD EXPLAIN DISPARITIES OF CONCERN TO THEM, AND IF WE HAD AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON THESE MATTERS WHICH WERE VITAL TO OUR SECURITY AND BY NO MEANS ONLY "PHILOSOPHY". THE WARSAW PACT SIDE, IN PRESENTING THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, HAD JUMPED FROM STAGE 1 TO STAGE 10, WHILE THE NATO COUNTRIES WERE PROCEEDING METHODICALLY.

KHLESTOV SAID THAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES SAW THE SITUATION DIFFERENTLY. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW IT MADE NO SENSE TO EXCLUDE AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR FORCES. IF ONE DISCUSSED DISPARITIES ONE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO DISCUSS THOSE DISPARITIES CONNECTED WITH ECONOMIC POTENTIAL, INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE, BUDGETARY RESOURCES AND MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY. NATO KNOWS OUR PHILOSOPHY AND THERE IS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING IT. THE RELATION OF FORCES WAS BALANCED AND HE SAW NO POINT IN NATO TRYING TO PROVE THAT THIS WAS OTHERWISE. THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NATO COUNTRIES

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09593 01 OF 02 201804Z

WERE JUST PILING UP DIFFICULTIES TO DELAY REDUCTIONS AND THAT THEY WANTED TO SPEAK ONLY ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES. A PRACTICAL APPROACH WOULD REQUIRE TO START WITH THE STRONGEST FORCES, AND THESE WERE IN THE NATO REDUCTION AREA THE BUNDESWEHR. KVITSINSKY ADDED THAT NATO CLAIMED THAT SOVIET FORCES WERE MORE THAN ONE HALF OF THE TOTAL WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. ON THE OTHER HAND THE BUNDESWEHR REPRESENTED ONE HALF OF THE TOTAL NATO FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

BEHREND REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST UNPRACTICAL TO DO EVERYTHING AT THE SAME TIME. METHODICAL STEP BY STEP APPROACH HAD PROVED TO BE MOST SUCCESSFUL IN SALT. IN SALT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT TABLED A DRAFT AGREEMENT ONE WEEK AFTER THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, I.E. WHY SALT WAS PROCEEDING SUCCESSFULLY. OUR PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS ARE

INFINITELY MORE COMPLEX. THEREFORE A STEP BY STEP APPROACH WAS EVEN MORE INDICATED HERE. (BEHREND'S USED THE SALT ARGUMENT SEVERAL TIMES; THE SOVIETS NEVER REPLIED TO THAT) THE WEST HAD AN OVERALL CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN TWO PHASES. THE EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SECOND PHASE AND THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS. THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING WHICH WOULD BE REACHED AT THE END OF PHASE 2 AND WHICH COULD ONLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY INCLUDING NATIONAL FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE WAS SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES' WISH TO PROCEED TO PHASE 2. BEHREND'S ALSO ARGUED AGAINST THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR FORCES AND POINTED OUT THAT IN BOTH CASES THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD BE BLURRED. FOR INSTANCE SOME OF NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WERE A COUNTERWEIGHT TO MRBM STATIONED ON SOVIET TERRITORY. KHLESTOV ASKED VERY INSISTENTLY AT WHAT TIME NEGOTIATIONS ON PHASE 2 WERE SUPPOSED TO BEING AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF PHASE 1 AGREEMENT. WOULD IT BE ON THE NEXT DAY? OR WOULIT BE ONLY AFTER THE REDUCTIONS AGREED IN PHASE 1 HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT?

BEHREND'S REPLIED THAT THE DATE FOR CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE AGREED IN THE PHASE 1 AGREEMENT. THERE SHOULD BE A PAUSE TO GIVE EVERYBODY A CHANCE TO RECOVER FROM THE STRAIN OF NEGOTIATING PHASE 1, BUT THAT PAUSE NEED NOT BE LONG.

KVITSINSKY SAID THAT DURING THIS PAUSE THE WEST WOULD FIND
SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 09593 01 OF 02 201804Z

A LOT OF FLAWS WITH THE PHASE 1 AGREEMENT AND WOULD THINK UP A LOT OF SO-CALLED ASSOCIATED MEASURES TO DELAY NEGOTIATIONS OF PHASE 2.

BEHREND'S SAID THAT THE PHASE 1 AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO CONTAIN ASSOCIATED MEASURES. THE WEST WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WERE NOT HONOURING THEIR COMMITMENT. AMBASSADOR KLEIN IN HIS STATEMENT SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM WHAT WAS MEANT WITH ASSOCIATED MEASURES AS MENTIONED BY AMBASSADOR RESOR IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT. MEASURES SUCH AS PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MILITARY EXERCISES AS DISCUSSED IN GENEVA WERE INDEPENDENT OF REDUCTIONS AND THUS NOT A MEASURE ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCTIONS. THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY CONTAINED A PROVISION THAT IN THE CASE OF ROTATION OF FORCES THE FORCE LEVELS WHICH HAD COME ABOUT AS THE CONSEQUENCE OF AGREED REDUCTIONS WOULD BE RESPECTED. THIS WAS IN HIS VIEW AN ASSOCIATED MEASURE AS MENTIONED IN THE PROTOCOL OF THE PRELIMINARY TALKS. COULD BEHREND'S GIVE ANY EXAMPLE FOR ASSOCIATED MEASURES?

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 09593 02 OF 02 201818Z

44

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 9593

FROM US MBFR REP

BEHREND REPLIED THAT FOR INSTANCE MILITARY EXERCISES OF A CERTAIN SIZE IN THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD HAVE TO REGULATED TO AVOID THE RISK OF MIS-INTERPRETATION. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT ONCE A CERTAIN FORCE LEVEL HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, NO ADDITIONAL FORCES COULD BE INTRODUCED IN THE AREA EVEN FOR EXERCISES.

BEHREND ASKED SEVERAL TIMES WHETHER THIS IMPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NO MORE SEND FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE REDUCTION AREA INTO THE REDUCTION ARE TO PARTICIPATE IN MILITARY EXERCISES. SINCE THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WANTED TO INCLUDE AIR FORCES WOULD THIS MEAN THAT SOVIET AIR FORCE UNITS STATIONED FOR INSTANCE ON SOVIET TERRITORY NEAR THE POLISH BORDER WOULD ON EXERCISE FLIGHTS NEVER CROSS THE SOVIET-POLISH BORDER? KHLESTOV DID NOT REPLY TO THESE QUESTIONS BUT REPEATED SOMEWHAT ANGRILY HIS STATEMENT THAT THE AGREED FORCE LEVELS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESPECTED UNDER EVERY CIRCUM-

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 09593 02 OF 02 201818Z

STANCES.

KVITSINSKY SAID THAT THE DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES CLAIMED BY THE WEST WERE JUST A TRICK. IF THE 200,000 NATO AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE REDUCTION AREA WERE ADDED THAT DISPARITY IN PERSONAL STRENGTH

WOULD DISAPPEAR.

BEHREND'S REPLIED THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAD CONSIDERABLY MORE PLANES IN THE REDUCTION AREA THAN NATO. KVITSINSKY REPLIED THAT NATO HAD MORE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. BEHREND'S POINTED OUT THAT THIS DISCUSSION PROVED THE NECESSITY OF DISCUSSING DATA.

KVITSINSKY SAID UNTIL NOW NATO HAD NOT SEEMED WORRIED ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT AIR FORCE. THE GREATER STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES WERE BALANCED BY NATO'S STRENGTH IN AIR FORCE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BEHREND'S REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD CONDUCT THIS INTERESTING DISCUSSION IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS. KVITSINSKY SAID THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE SIMPLIFIED BY JUST TAKING THE TOTAL GROUND FORCE AND AIR FORCE LEVELS AS A STARTING POINT.

BEHREND'S POINTED OUT THE THE EASTERN DRAFT PROPOSAL SEEMED TO US TO BE NOT SIMPLE AT ALL BUT VERY COMPLICATED. WHAT WAS THE BASIS OF THE CALCULATION OF 5 0/0 AND 10 0/0? WAS IT PERSONNEL, UNITS OR COMBAT CAPABILITY? HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE TO COMPARE THE RELATIVE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE UNITS OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF 11 NATIONS? FOR INSTANCE AN AMERICAN ARMORED DIVISION HAD CONSIDERABLY MORE PERSONNEL BUT LESS TANKS THAN A SOVIET ARMORED DIVISION.

KVITSINSKY SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO DIFFICULT. IN THE CASE ONE MIGHT FOR INSTANCE EQUATE ONE AMERICAN ARMORED DIVISION WITH SOVIET ARMORED DIVISIONS. KHLESTOV ASKED WHAT THE FIGURE X OF THE COMMON CEILING MEANT. WHAT DID IT RELATE TO: PERSONNEL STRENGTH OR COMBAT CAPABILITY
KVITSINSKY ASKED WHETHER THE FIGURE X AS 700,000 OR 750,000.

BEHREND'S REPLIED THAT THE NATO COUNTRIES WOULD SOON PRESENT PRECISE PROPOSALS. THE DISPARITIES WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN THE FIELD OF COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF GROUND FORCES.

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09593 02 OF 02 201818Z

KHLESTOV SAID HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE ASSUMPTION THAT NATO HAD MADE MISTAKES IN ITS FORCE PLANNING. THE PRESENT RELATION OF FORCES REPRESENTED THE REAL AND REALISTIC SITUATION. YOU WILL ATTEMPT TO STRENGTHEN YOUR FORCES. THAT WILL BE VERY BAD. REDUCTIONS CANNOT BE ABSTRACTED FROM THE POLITIAL SITUATION.

BEHREND'S REPLIED THAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAD CONSIDERABLY REINFORCED THEIR FORCES IN THE REDUCTION ARE IN THE LAST YEARS. THE EAST COULD HARDLY BLAME THE WEST FOR HAVING SHOWN RESTRAINT AND NOT INCREASED THEIR FORCES CORRESPONDINGLY.

KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE SENSELESS TO START A HISTORICAL

RESEARCHOF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT IN THE LAST 20 YEARS.

KVITSINSKY ADDED THAT ONE COULD ARGUE THAT THE WARSAW PACT WAS FORCED TO MAKE UP FOR INBALANCES EXISTING PREVIOUSLY PARTICULARLY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD.

BEHRENDIS REPLIED THAT HE HAD REFERRED TO WARSAW PACR REINFORCEMENTS IN THE LAST YEARS WHICH HAD INCREASED DISPARITIES OF CONERN TO THE WEST. OUR DISCUSSION HAD SHOWN THE NECESSITY OF TALKING ABOUT DATA.

KVITSINSKY SAID THAT DATA VARY AND CORRESPONDED TO THE SITUATION. YOU WILL NOT BELIEVE OUR DATA ANYWAY. HE RAISED THE QUESION OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF TRAINED RESERVES OF THE BUNDESWEHR, WHICH COULD E MOBILIZED VERY QUICKLY.

BEHRENDIS SAID THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD A RESERVE POTENTIAL. KVITSINSKY REPLIED THAT IT DEPENDED HOW RESERVES WERE ORGANIZED.

KHLESTOV ASKED WHCIH FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED ON NATO'S SIDE TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING. WOULD IT BE ONLY AMERICAN FORCES? WOULD BRITISH FORCES BE INCLUDED?

BEHRENDIS REPLIED THAT IN THE SECOND PHASE EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED. AS TO BRITISH FORCES, HE SHOULD ASK AMBASSADOR ROSE.

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 09593 02 OF 02 201818Z

KHLESTOV SAID THAT BRITISH FORCES WERE STATIONED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT BRITISH FORCES WERE INCLUDED. HE ASKED FOR HOW LONG THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD ONCINTEU TO DISCUSS PHILOSOPHY.

BEHRENDIS REFERRED AGAIN TO SALT AS AN EXAMPLE FOR A RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO PROCEDURE.

KHLESTOV SAID IN CONSLUSION THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAN WERE VERY IMPORTANT, AND A CLOSE CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ALSO IN THE FIELD OF FORCE REDUCTIONS WAS NECESSARY.

BEHRENDIS WELCOMED THIS. HE POINTED OUT THAT NATO HAD AN INTEGRATED DEFENCE AND THEREFORE ALSO AN INTEGRATED REDUCTIONS PROGRAMME.
END TEXT.HUMES

SECRET

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